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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 860014
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE CASH,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, George Cash, was charged with a second degree
felony theft pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended)
§76-6-402.

The Defendant was further charged with being a

Habitual Criminal.

The Defendant was convicted in a jury trial

held on December 16, 1985 of second degree felony theft in the
Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of
Utah, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding.

The Defendant on

the 17th day of December 1985 was found guilty of being a
Habitual Criminal based on the second degree theft conviction.
Judge Roth sentenced defendant to a term in the Utah State Prison
for 1 to 15 years for each conviction to run concurrent.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with a second degree felony theft
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended) §76-6-402,
alleging that on the 21st day of August 1985 the Defendant
exercised unauthorized control over the property of Car-A-Sell,
and/or Terry Deamer, a 1976 Corvette operable motor vehicle with
the purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

The Defendant was also
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alleged to be a Habitua] Criminal having prior convictions in
1977 and 1981 for which he was sentenced to prison.
At trial the evidence was presented as follows:
It was established that on the 21st day of August, 1985, a
black Corvette vehicle was on consignment at Car-A-Sell in Ogden,
Utah. (T. 10)

One or two days prior to this date, the Defendant

went into Car-A-Sell and took the vehicle for a test drive.
After returning the vehicle to Car-A-Sell, the Defendant took the
keys to the vehicle and walked out of the establishment. (T.
10-20)

On the night of August 21, 1985, after the Car-A-Sell

establishment was closed for business, the Defendant went back,
got into the vehicle, and drove it off. (T. 55)
It was established through evidence that the car was gone
approximately two weeks when the Defendant was arretted in
Arizona with the vehicle, and subsequently extradited back to
Utah to stand trial.

The Defendant testified that it was never

his intention to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle,
but rather he intended to take the car for a drive, show it off
to friends and relatives living in Texas and return the vehicle.
(T. 56-69)
It was established through the Defendants testimony, as
well as through pictures taken by Defendant and entered into
evidence as Exhibits, that the Defendant drove the vehicle
through Denver, Colorado, down through New Mexico to Rockport
Texas, which is on the Gulf of Mexico. (T. 36, 56-69)

He stayed

in Rockport, Texas for several days showing the car to friends
and to his family, claiming the car was his.

The Defendant then
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began his journey back toward Utah, in an attempt to return the
car to Ogden. (T. 63)

The Defendant intended to abandon the

vehicle where Car-A-Sell could readily find the car and then walk
away, hoping never to be caught. (T. 69)

The Defendant made it

as far as Kingmen, Arizona, at which time he was arrested on a
totally unrelated charge.

The police broadcase a description of

the vehicle over the National Crime Computer Network and found
that it had been stolen.
Evidence at trial established that the Defendant took
extremely good care of the Car. (T. 13, 14)

The Defendant washed

and waxed the car and had various mechanical repairs done to the
vehicle.

The owner testified that is was in excellent condition

when it was returned. (T.13, 14, 59)

The Defendant also

testified several times that he knew that he could not keep the
car, and he intended at all times to return the car to the owner,
but was thwarted in that attempt by his arrest in Kingmen,
Arizona.

In Chambers during the course of the trial, defense

counsel requested a lessor included offense be presented to the
jury, the lesser included offense being the unlawful taking of a
vehicle, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as amended)
§41-1-109(2).

The Court refused to give the lesser included

offense to the jury, and after a two and one half hour
deliberation, the jury came back with a guilty verdict to the
second degree theft. (T. 71-74, 90-91)

After a verdict of guilty

was rendered, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for mis-trial
on the grounds that the Judge had failed to include an
instruction concerning a lesser included offense.

(T. 96-98)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In 1983, the Utah Legislature amended §41-1-109 of the Utah
Code Annotated 1953 (as amended).

The basis of the change in the

statute involved a separation of the unlawful taking of a vehicle
into two categories of offenses. The first category is where an
individual took temporary unlawful possession of a vehicle and
returned it within 24 hours. That offense is deemed a Class "B"
Misdemeanor.

The real modification in this statute involves the

addition of sub-section 2 in which the Legislature made the
unlawful taking of a vehicle a third degree felony, if the
vehicle was not returned within 24 hours of the taking.

In the

attempt to separate this offense into two separate categories,
the Legislature used some awkward wording which is the essence of
the appeal in the present case.
The change of the wording in the statute involved in the
present appeal is the addition of the words "and returns the
vehicle to the owner".

The present case involves a situation in

which there is abundant evidence supporting Defendant's
contention that his intention was to temporarily deprive the
owner of the vehicle.

The problem that arose in this particular

case, was that the Defendant was arrestedf thereby thwarting his
attempt to return the vehicle to the owner.
It is clear that the Legislature never intended the
intervening arrest by a police office to nullify the effects of
this statute.

If an individual truly has the intent to return a

vehicle, his actions should come within the purview of this
statute.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION
FOR A LESSOR INCLUDED OFFENSE OF UNLAWFUL TAKING OF A
VEHICLE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY PURSUANT TO §41-1-109,
WHERE TESTIMONY RECEIVED DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL
SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF
RETURNING THE "EHTCLE WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED ?V POLICE.
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stated, "the crime of theft with which the defendant was charged
includes the lessor offense of unlawful taking of a vehicle under
UCA §41-1-109".

(id at 717)

The Court went even further in holding that unlawful taking
of a vehicle is a lessor included offense of second degree felony
vehicle theft in the case of State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228
(Utah 1980).

In this case the Court was presented with a factual

situation quite similar to the case at hand.

In Chestnut the

police stopped the defendant who was in possession of a
motorcycle and subsequently charged him with second degree felony
vehicle theft. The Supreme Court in that decision reversed a
trial Court's refusal to give a lesser included offense of
unlawful taking of a vehicle.

See also, State v. Cornish, 568

P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) where the Court held joy riding is a lessor
included offense of auto theft in a case where a Defendant took a
car, was stopped for a traffic violation and was subsequently
arrested for second degree felony theft of a'vehicle.
The holdings in the above cited cases represent decisions
under the former §41-1-109 prior to the 1983 amendments. In 1983
the Utah Legislature amended the joy riding statute to include
the words, "and returns the vehicle to the owner or lawful
custodian within 24 hours of the taking is guilty of a
misdemeanor".

The Legislature added

sub-section 2 which now

states, "an offense under this section is a third degree felony
if the person returns the vehicle more than 2 4 hours after the
taking.
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given in the present case to show Defendant intended only a
temporary deprivation.

The Court should have allowed the jury an

opportunity to determine the Defendant's guilt under that lessor
statute.
CONCLUSION

The trial Court erred in failing to give the Defendant's
requested lessor included instruction of unlawful taking of a
vehicle.

Although the language of that section could be read as

to requiring the actual return by the Defendant of the vehicle,
it is clear that the Legislature never intended the intervening
arrest by a police officer to nulify the effects of this statute.
In the present case where there is evidence to support an intent
to temporarily deprive the owner of the vehicle, the Defendant
should be entitled to an instruction on this lessor included
offense.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisisj&\
^J$U \day of April, 1986.

RANDALL W. RICHARDS
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